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Abstract
This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational
concerns in certification markets. We argue that by revealing less precise informa-
tion a certifier reduces the threat of capture. Opaque disclosure rules may reduce
profits but also constrain feasible bribes. For large discount factors a certifier is un-
constrained in the choice of a disclosure rule and full disclosure maximizes profits.
For intermediate discount factors, only less precise, such as noisy, disclosure rules
are implementable. Our results suggest that contrary to the common view, coarse
disclosure may be socially desirable. A ban may provoke market failure especially
in industries where certifier reputational rents are low.
Keywords: Certification; Bribery; Reputation
JEL Classification Numbers: L15; D82; L14; L11
∗Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin, martin.pollrich@hu-berlin.de
†DIW Berlin, lwagner@diw.de
We are grateful to Pio Baake, Helmut Bester, Renato Gomez, Alessandro Lizzeri, Tymofiy Mylovanov,
Patrick Rey, Roland Strausz and seminar participants in Berlin, Mannheim and Toulouse for helpful
comments and discussions. Martin Pollrich gratefully acknowledges financial support by ANR and DFG
through project ”Market Power in Vertically Related Markets” and by DFG through SFB/TR 15 and
RTG 1659.
1
1 Introduction
In markets that exhibit informational asymmetries, product quality is typically reduced.
This in turn may provoke a breakdown of trade. The lack of credible communication
between informed and uninformed parties may result in the emergence of certification
intermediaries. Certifiers inspect products whose characteristics are private information
to agents, and publicly reveal this information. Examples abound: rating agencies, eco-
labels, wine certificates or technical inspections. Often however, results are revealed on
a coarse scale, although the information at hand allows for a more precise disclosure.
A rich literature starting with Lizzeri (1999) has identified profit concerns as the cause
for information disclosure by intermediaries being imprecise.1 The rough intuition is that
for the certifier’s profit it is more important that many certificates are sold and not what
the informational content of certificates is.
In this paper, we provide a new explanation for such opacity. We show that partially
revealing rules can serve as a safeguard against fraud: certifiers may be tempted to accept
bribes for releasing favorable certificates. This behavior, which we call capture, enables
the certifier to extract payments other than the certification fee. If consumers are aware
of this threat of capture, then the certifier must find ways to credibly commit to honesty.
We show that one way to do so is to employ an opaque disclosure rule.
Opacity reduces the producer’s willingness to pay for bribery, because a more opaque
disclosure rule lowers differences in the values of certificates. Hence, opacity can be
welfare enhancing for the simple reason that it may prevent market failure. This result
is surprising because it contradicts the commonly held view that reducing informational
asymmetries is socially desirable per se.2
Our results are important in the light of recent policy debates regarding the regulation
of the market for credit ratings. The ’Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act’ includes without limitation regulations regarding the disclosure practice
1See the literature review at the end of this section.
2We are not the first to discover such an effect. Mason (2011) argues that the introduction of noisy
eco-labels may reduce welfare. Similarly, Langinier and Babcock (2008) study welfare effects when firms
can certify as a group. Kreps and Wilson (1982) show that noise enhances welfare in finitely repeated
games.
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of rating agencies.3 Though this kind of regulation would be innocent, if opacity was only
caused by certifiers’ profit concerns, it has a potential downside when the mere existence
of the market depends on opacity. As we argue in this paper, transparency is vulnerable
against collusion between certifiers and sellers who demand certification. The economic
purpose of opacity is to make the certification market work in the first place and not only
to maximize profits.
We show our results in a model that allows us to delineate reputational and profit con-
cerns - thus opacity caused by reputational concerns is present even when this does not
maximize profits. We consider an infinitely repeated certification game with moral haz-
ard where, in each period, short-lived producers first have to make an investment choice,
which in turn determines the probability distribution of their product’s quality. Thus,
the payoffs assigned to each quality outcome determine the incentives to invest. The
long-lived certifier has two instruments at his disposal: a flat certification fee and the dis-
closure rule. Consumers experience the true quality of a product only after consumption.
If it does not match the awarded certificate, capture is detected. This makes the certifier
face a classical reputation dilemma: she trades off short-run gains from capture against
future profits.
We characterize feasible disclosure rules in this setting. Our major finding is that for
sufficiently low discount factors, honest certification requires partial disclosure of quality
information, which in our model implies noisy disclosure. In the short run, a certifier
may gain from making a capture offer that is acceptable for at least some producers. The
maximum producer willingness to pay for bribes is directly affected by the publicly an-
nounced disclosure rule. It is greatest for full disclosure and can be substantially reduced
by revealing less precise information. But if consumers detect a bribe and therefore lose
trust, a certifier gives up his future profits. Static certifier profits are maximal for full
disclosure and any deviation will typically reduce the long-run loss from losing credibility.
As will be shown, the first effect exceeds the latter.
We moreover obtain the counterintuitive result that a threat of capture increases so-
3E.g. Title IV, Sec. 404 and Sec. 405. For a comprehensive review of this Act and its impact on
rating agencies see also Goel and Thakor (2011)
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cial welfare.4 Whenever information is fully revealed, sharing profits necessarily reduces
producer investments as compared to the first-best level, obtained under complete in-
formation. We show that whenever capture offers are made before a certifier observes
the true quality level, these are such that they are accepted by either all producers or
only by low quality producers. If the highest threat of capture stems from offers that are
accepted by all producers and the disclosure rule is noisy, credibility can be maintained
by making honest certification more attractive to high quality producers. This in turn
increases equilibrium investment levels as compared to full information disclosure.
Related literature. A stream of literature seeks to explain why certifiers often choose
to only partially reveal quality information. Lizzeri (1999) finds that it is optimal for
a monopolistic certifier in a static adverse selection environment to reveal almost no
information. In this setting, this result is robust to introducing capture because a no
revelation policy simply annihilates producer incentives to bribe. In the presence of
moral hazard however, information revelation is necessary to create incentives for the
provision of quality. Albano and Lizzeri (2001) study optimal disclosure rules in a static
model of both moral hazard and adverse selection. In their setting, a certifier chooses
to employ noisy disclosure if his set of actions is restricted to flat fees. Kartasheva and
Yilmaz (2013) explain imprecise ratings in a model with partially informed investors
and heterogeneous liquidity needs of issuers. No disclosure is not optimal, because it
deters high quality issuers from participating. With full disclosure, the fee is determined
by the willingness to pay of the lowest certified type. Awarding to this type the best
certificate with small but positive probability therefore allows for increasing the fee and
also profits. All papers mentioned above have profit maximization as the sole objective
of the certifier. In contrast, this paper suggests reputational concerns as another origin
of a certifiers preference for coarse quality disclosure. In particular, the model we provide
features full disclosure as a profit maximizing disclosure rule and nevertheless the certifier
resorts to opacity because otherwise she cannot signal honesty.
4We analyze a belief system that substantially restricts the set of feasible disclosure rules. For
different belief systems and sufficiently low discount factors, other (opaque) rules may be chosen by the
certifier. The effect on social welfare is therefore not a general result.
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Farhi et al. (2013) apply the term opacity to the disclosure of rejected applications for
a certificate. In their model, a seller can turn to various certifiers, which differ in their
acceptance of quality and whether they disclose true quality or only whether quality is
not the lowest. The competition of certifiers makes ’rejection’ a valuable information,
whereas in our model there is only one chance to get certified and this information is
worthless. Again, the certifiers preference for opacity stems from profit concerns. In a
similar vein, Faure-Grimaud et al. (2009) consider a model where the contract between
the seller and the certifier entails the ownership of the rating, i.e. whether the seller can
conceal it or not. If firms have only an imprecise signal of their own quality and some
do not ask for a rating, simple ownership contracts emerge where the certification result
is not published by the certifier but owned by the seller who can publish or conceal the
result. In both studies the certifier’s disclosure rule in terms of intrinsic product quality
is exogenously given - opacity is referred to as the potential concealment of certificates
and certification procedures and arises from profit concerns of the certifiers.
In Pagano and Volpin (2012) it is the seller who decides to release coarse information. In
their model of rating asset-backed securities, the rating agencies’ role is to confirm the
information the issuer wants to conceal. It is again a profit concern that leads to opacity.
The threat of capture in certification markets has been analyzed by Strausz (2005). In a
pure adverse selection setting with mandatory full disclosure, he analyzes the effects of
a threat of capture on certification prices. He finds that in order to maintain credibility,
for low discount factors, a certifier raises fees above the static monopoly price. This
result is consistent with our finding: A larger fee reduces the share of certifying types
and thereby increases the value of an uncertified product. As in our paper, it turns
out that a major determinant for the certifiers credibility is the maximal bribe, which
corresponds to largest difference in certification outcomes, e.g. the difference in values
for the best certificate and uncertified products. A larger fee increases this cut-off but
this implies that less information is revealed in equilibrium. Although this effect is also
present in Strausz (2005), he however does not explicitly point it out. As in the present
paper, credibility is maintained by reducing the maximal willingness to bribe. In Strausz
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(2005), this is affected by the value of not being certified, which, in turn, is an increasing
function of the certification fee.
There is a rich literature on reputation building in markets with informational asym-
metries. For example, Shapiro (1983) analyzes the forces at work when sellers build
reputation. Biglaiser (1993) investigates the role of market intermediaries when sellers
are unable to build their own reputation. Examples of works that treat reputational
concerns of rating agencies are Mathis et al. (2009) and Bolton et al. (2012). In con-
trast to the present paper, these works follow the asymmetric information approach to
reputations, where certifiers are assumed to always be committed (i.e. honest) with pos-
itive probability.5 This, however, does not allow for studying the interaction between
repuational concerns and information disclosure. The reason is that only false certifica-
tion within a given disclosure rule can be studied, because with the committed certifier
type the disclosure rule is already fixed and any departure reveals the certifier being not
honest. Instead of assuming that testing by the certifier is imperfect as is done in those
works, we show how imperfect testing may endogenously arise in equilibrium.
We conclude this literature review by listing two related papers that do not focus on
certification in particular. Levin (2003) extends the standard moral hazard setting to
situations where contractual agreements are enforceable only to a certain degree and
where reciprocal relations are long-term. The optimal contract derived by Levin has a
coarse structure, which parallels our finding of coarse disclosure being optimal. As in
our paper, coarseness stems from a binding reputational constraint. The interaction of
disclosure and incentives to exert effort is studied in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010). In
a model where a teacher seeks to induce effort by her students, it is shown that coarse
grading schemes can help to induce all students to employ effort if they are disparate and
care about their status in class.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analyzes the static game in the absence of bribery. In section 4, we treat the general
case of certification under the threat of capture. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are
5See Mailath and Samuelson (2012, Chapter IV) for a discussion of this approach.
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begin of period t
producer chooses et
producer learns qt
good sold in auction
consumers learn qt
begin of period t+ 1
Figure 1: Timing in one period without certification
presented in the appendix.
2 The setup
We consider a dynamic framework in discrete time. In each period t = 1, 2, . . . ,∞,
a short-lived monopolistic producer is born. He produces a single unit of quality qt ∈
{ql, qh}, where 0 ≤ ql < qh. In the following, we refer to a high type producer if his product
quality is qh and to a low type producer otherwise. Prior to production, a producer chooses
some investment level et ∈ [0, 1]. Quality is stochastic and the probability of the produced
good being of high quality qh is given by Prob(qt = q
h|et) = et. This probability function
is independent of t, i.e. quality levels are independent across time. Investment costs are
given by the function k(·). We assume k(·) to be increasing and strictly convex. For
technical reasons we assume a non-negative third derivative, so that the certifier’s profit
function is concave and to guarantee interior solutions we additionally assume k′(0) ≤ ql
and k′(1) ≥ qh.
Consumers’ reservation prices equal (expected) qualities. Both investment and quality
level are private information to the producer. Consumers observe the product quality
only after consumption. All other components of the model are common knowledge. The
equilibrium concept we use throughout the paper is that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Each producer is short-lived and leaves the market at the end of a period. Goods are
sold in a second-price auction.6 Figure 1 summarizes the timing in period t.
To simplify notation, we set ql ≡ 0 and define v := qh− ql. In the benchmark of complete
information high quality goods are sold in the second-price auction at price v and low
6The second price auction results in a standard monopoly price that equals consumers’ valuations. It
circumvents signaling issues, e.g. letting the informed party take a publicly observed action that might
be interpreted as a signal.
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quality goods are sold at price 0. The producer then chooses e to maximize expected
profits ev−k(e). The first-best investment level e∗ is thus given by k′(e∗) = v, which lies
in the interval [0, 1] due to our assumption k′(1) ≥ v. In particular we have e∗ > 0.
Under asymmetric information and in the absence of any further economic institution, a
producer cannot persuade consumers that he offers a high quality good and the market
price can therefore not be made contingent on a good’s quality. It is standard to show that
the Perfect Bayesian market outcome involves a market breakdown. In such an outcome,
consumers form a belief q˜t about the offered quality, which reflects their willingness to
pay. In equilibrium, this belief has to be consistent with the actual expected quality,
E(qt|et). Given any belief, the producer’s optimal choice of investment will be et = 0,
as he maximizes q˜t − k(et). But since E(qt|0) = 0, the unique equilibrium has producers
choosing et = 0 in every period and the quality of the good is zero in each period. The
result is a market failure: high quality is never offered in equilibrium. We summarize this
finding in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Without certification, producers choose et = 0 in each period. In equilibrium,
quality is given by qt = 0 and the price is 0 in each period.
This inefficiency calls for the emergence of alternative market institutions to facilitate
supply of high quality. The focus of this paper lies on certification as one such institu-
tion. Assume that an infinitely long-lived certifier enters the market. She offers to disclose
the result of some potentially imperfect test of the good’s quality, prior to it being sold.
More precisely, at the beginning of the game, in period t = 0, the certifier announces a fee
f ≥ 0 and a disclosure rule D = (C, αl, αh).7 8 The fee is to be paid by any producer who
wishes to have his product tested. The disclosure rule consists of a set C = {C1, . . . , Cm}
of potential certificates and probability vectors αl and αh, where the k-th entry of vector
7Assuming a single fee f , that does not depend on the certificate, is without loss in the setting with
only two quality levels. The best a certifier could do is, following the revelation principle, to offer a menu
of ’contracts’ for the two potential producer types. Eventually, there is one payment referring to the high
type and one referring to the low type. It can be easily shown that the optimal contract corresponds to
the full disclosure rule, where high types pay f and low types pay 0 and true quality is revealed.
8The fee f creates a distortion as will become clear later on. The certifier could implement the first-
best outcome, but only when moving first, i.e. when demanding an upfront payment before producers
choose their investment. This timing however seems unreasonable in many certification markets.
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prod. chooses et
prod. learns qt
prod. certify: y/n
Ct disclosed if y
∅ disclosed if n
in auction
good sold
consumers
learn qt
Figure 2: Timing of a period t with certification
αi reflects the probability that a product of quality qi is awarded certificate Ck when-
ever tested. We do not assume that those probabilities add up to one, i.e. we allow for∑m
k=1 α
i
k < 1. Hence, a product may remain uncertified with the conforming probability
and will be sold as such. We assume that consumers cannot observe whether a product
was tested, unless it is offered with a certificate.9 Possible disclosure rules encompass for
example full disclosure, where C = {C1, C2} and α2 = (0, 1) as well as α1 = (1, 0), or no
disclosure, where C = {C} and αi = (1).10 For a given certificate Ck, consumers form
a belief q˜C
k
about the true quality of a product. The belief for uncertified products is
denoted q˜∅. For notational convenience we henceforth add ∅ to the set of certificates C,
which refers to uncertified products. Hence, C = {C1, . . . , Cm, ∅}.
An interpretation of the disclosure rule, which we shall use throughout the paper, is the
following: the certifier can create any test that leads to a grading scheme with grades from
the set C and results in the respective grades with conforming probabilities. This may be
done with a computer program or a statistical test. In particular, after the test result is
obtained, the certifier and the consumers share the same beliefs on product quality.
Finally we assume that the certifier’s inspection costs are zero11 and that she discounts
future profits at rate δ ∈ (0, 1). Figure 2 illustrates the timing of the game with certifi-
cation.
9Hence products which “failed” the test are sold under the same label as products that didn’t even
take the test. This assumption is not crucial, since the certifier can replicate any outcome of a game
where consumers are able to observe whether a product applied for certification.
10Note that certificates do not carry an intrinsic value. In the case that quality is fully revealed,
whether C1 or C2 is the valuable certificate depends on the choice of α.
11This assumption simplifies the analysis without substantially affecting the results, which continue
to hold as presented here for small but strictly positive inspection costs. Large inspection costs leave
most of our results still valid, but create cumbersome case distinctions.
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3 Optimal honest certification
In this section, we analyze certifier equilibrium strategies when the certifier is honest. By
the stationary structure of the model, we can restrict our analysis to the certifier decision
(D, f) plus a single period of production. Let piD(f) denote the equilibrium profit of the
certifier, when adopting disclosure rule D with certification fee f .
We first study the case of full disclosure in some detail, as it will turn out that this
disclosure rule can be used to achieve maximal profits. Consider the case that quality
is fully revealed such that αh = (1, 0) and αl = (0, 1). Any product that is awarded
C1 is sold at a price v, whereas C2 is worth nothing. The only plausible equilibrium is
one where only high types apply for certification.12 A producer chooses his investment
according to
e = argmax
e˜
e˜ · (v − f)− k(e˜). (3.1)
This implies k′(e) = v − f in equilibrium and certifier expected equilibrium profits can
be expressed as
piFD(e) = e · (v − k′(e)). (3.2)
Denote eFD the equilibrium effort level under a full disclosure rule and fFD the respective
fee that maximizes certifier profits under full disclosure. The following lemma proves that
these values do exist and are unique.
Lemma 2. Under full disclosure, there exists a unique fee fFD that maximizes certifier
profits. The uniquely defined equilibrium investment level eFD is implicitly given by
k′′(eFD) · eFD = v − k′(eFD). (3.3)
The fee is fFD = v− k′(eFD) and the (subgame-) equilibrium profit is piFD = eFD · fFD.
We continue analyzing general disclosure rules. The entire set of disclosure rules is com-
plex and difficult to handle analytically. A closer look at equation (3.2), which allows us
12Trivially, low quality producers do not demand certification when f > 0 since their revenues are
most zero.
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to express the certifier profit as function of the implemented investment level e, points to
the advantages of using an indirect approach. We can express the attained profit of any
certifier policy (D, f) solely in terms of the induced investment level e. This allows for a
straightforward comparison of attained profits and leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For any disclosure rule D =
(C, α1, α0) and any fee f ≥ 0, it holds that
piD(f) ≤ piFD in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 states that the certifier will always find it optimal to employ a full disclosure
rule. The reason is that, investment incentives depend on the difference between payoffs
from selling high and low quality products. Given full disclosure, the certification fee is
sufficient to fully control this difference.
We conclude this section by pointing out that full disclosure is not the unique disclosure
rule that yields the maximal certifier profit piFD. First of all, one can implement the
outcome of full disclosure with various disclosure rules by adding redundant certificates
- either additional certificates for high types, which then all have the same value in
equilibrium, or by adding certificates for low types that will not be issued in equilibrium.
Because we assumed certification to be costless for the certifier, other rules equally achieve
the maximal per-period profit: Issue two different certificates C1 and C2. Low quality
products are only eligible for certificate C2, hence αl = (0, 1). High quality products
receive certificate C1 with probability α ∈ (0, 1) and C2 otherwise, therefore αh = (α, 1−
α). With this structure, it is possible to sustain an equilibrium in which all producer types
demand certification.13 The optimal certifier profit piFD is then obtained by choosing f
and α appropriately.14
Disclosure rules of the latter kind play a crucial rule for the remainder of this paper. We
henceforth refer to them as partial disclosure rules.
13For this, we have to set the off-equilibrium belief q˜∅ = 0 and all other beliefs underly Bayesian
updating.
14We formally show this in the proof of Proposition 6.
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prod. chooses et
prod. learns qt
capture offer (C, b)
certifier makes
prod. a/r
prod. certify: y/n
only if r:
disclosure:
Ct if y, ∅ if n, C if a
in auction
good sold
consumers
learn qt
Figure 3: Timing of a period t with certification and capture
4 The capture problem
So far we assume that the certifier sticks to the announced disclosure rule, in particu-
lar that she conducts the lottery honestly and grants the respective certificate. However,
there is pressure from producers who wish to be awarded better certificates. For instance,
if disclosure is meant to be noisy, a certifier might be willing to guarantee a producer a
high value certificate in exchange for a bribe. In this section we address this issue by
formally introducing the possibility of capture.
We follow Strausz (2005) in modeling the possibility of capture, using the framework of
enforceable capture as initiated by Tirole (1986). Hence we assume that the certifier and
the producer can write an enforceable side-contract with transfers. Consumers are fully
aware of the possibility of these side-contracts, but cannot observe them. Specifically,
we model capture as follows: after a producer has learned his type qt, but before decid-
ing upon certification, the certifier, without observing qt, may make an offer (C, b) to
the producer. The offer consists of a certificate C, issued in case of acceptance, and a
financial transfer b to be paid by the producer. The certifier thus offers to ”sell” the sure
certificate C at the price b, circumventing the customary certification procedure given by
the disclosure rule. Hence, (C, b) are the terms at which she is willing to become cap-
tured. A producer however can reject this offer and, if willing to do so, insist on honest
certification by paying the fee f . This last assumption is motivated following Kofman
and Lawarre´e (1993) in assuming that the certifier cannot forge certification without the
help of the producer. Figure 3 displays the timing in a representative period t, allowing
for the possibility of capture.
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Note that the choice of the disclosure rule puts some limits on the set of feasible capture
offers. For a general disclosure rule D = {C, α} only offers of the form (C, b) with C ∈ C
are feasible.15
Within the framework presented here, capture may subvert honest certification for two
reasons.16 First, producers with low quality products are willing to side-contract with
the certifier in order to obtain better certification. Second, high types may want to avoid
uncertainty if disclosure is noisy.
In this section we are interested in the existence and characterization of equilibria where
the certifier resists the temptation of making any capture offer of the above described
kind. Throughout, we will work with different specifications of trigger beliefs. This
becomes necessary as the ability of consumers to detect capture varies across disclosure
rules. We assume consumers are able to perfectly observe quality after consumption.
Therefore, if D is full disclosure or if certain certificates are awarded exclusively to high
types, capture detection is also perfect.
Our particular idea behind the consumers’ beliefs is the following: They stop trusting
the certifier immediately if a false testimony about a product’s quality is detected. Then,
producers are not willing to pay for certification anymore. Consequently the certifier will
lose future demand and makes zero profits henceforth. This prevents the certifier from
becoming captured in the first place. We shall make this more precise in the following
subsections.
4.1 Capture under full disclosure
Consider again the full disclosure rule introduced in section 3, i.e. there are the certificates
C1 and C2 where C1 is only awarded to high quality products. Because, by Proposition
1, a certifier would want to employ full disclosure whenever possible, we start by investi-
gating capture under a full disclosure rule. We assume that consumers trust certificates
15This will be made more precise when formally introducing consumer beliefs. Granting a certificate
which is not contained in D is certainly perceived as cheating by consumers. Consequently consumers
believe to be faced with a worthless product and they will lose trust in the certifier’s credibility.
16When certification is costly for the certifier, there is a third reason: saving certification cost! As
already mentioned in Footnote 11 our analysis can be extended to c > 0, but this involves some troubling
case-by-case distinctions.
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as long as they have not detected a deviation. A certifier who anticipates this behavior
may be prevented from succumbing to the temptation of becoming captured by the fact
that losing credibility will leave her without demand in future periods.
Denote ht = (Ct, qt) the certification outcome in period t, where Ct is the issued certifi-
cate in period t and qt is the true quality observed after consumption. If certification
in period t did not take place, then Ct = ∅. Now let Ht = (h1, . . . , ht−1) summarize
the history of certification at the beginning of period t. Finally, we denote q˜t(Ct, Ht) a
consumer’s belief in period t when faced with a product carrying certificate Ct and when
having observed history Ht. The following assumption on consumers’ beliefs covers the
described behavior.17
Assumption 1. The consumers’ beliefs q˜t(Ct, Ht) satisfy q˜t(Ct, Ht) = q˜
Ct whenever
{τ < t|qCτ 6= qτ ∨ Cτ /∈ C ∪ {∅}} = ∅. Moreover q˜t(Ct, Ht) = 0 whenever {τ < t|q˜Cτ 6=
qτ ∨ Cτ /∈ C ∪ {∅}} 6= ∅ and q˜t(Ct, Ht) = 0 whenever Ct /∈ C.
The assumption states that consumers trust the certifier if capture was not observed in
the past. They however lose trust forever, once they detected cheating. Losing trust
implies that consumers believe for any certifier’s claim that the offered quality is zero.
With full disclosure, there are (at most) two types of bribing offers that can be made:
(C1, b) and (C2, b). Obviously, an offer (C2, b) is turned down by all types of producers, as
it is worth nothing. Hence, in the following we focus on offers (C1, b) and talk of a bribe
b rather than (C1, b). An offer b is accepted by high producer types whenever b < f . Low
quality producers accept any bribe b < v because acceptance will yield positive profits
compared to zero profits for rejection. In equilibrium, the certifier assigns probability
e(f) to the event that a producer is of high type, where e(f) is the producer’s optimal in-
vestment under full disclosure, derived from (3.1). We are interested in equilibria where
capture does not occur. In all such equilibria, a producer chooses his optimal invest-
ment level knowing that he will not receive an acceptable capture offer. The acceptance
17Note that consumers do not lose trust in the certifier when a product is awarded certificate C2,
although this should not happen in equilibrium. It is not necessary to include this case into consumers’
beliefs, because any such event can only follow a non-profitable deviation by the certifier.
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probability p(b|f) of bribing offer b given the certification fee f is given by
p(b|f) =

1, if b < f,
1− e(f), if f ≤ b < v,
0, if b ≥ v.
(4.1)
We denote by ΠD(f) =
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1piD(f) = piD(f)/(1 − δ) the certifier’s expected profit
from honest certification under disclosure rule D and fee f . The certifier’s expected
profit from offering bribe b is denoted by Π̂D(b|f) and depends on whether the consumer
detected capture as follows: whenever b < f , all producer types will accept the bribe,
but only for low quality producers this is detected. Hence, Π̂FD(b|f) = b+e(f)δΠFD(f).
For f ≤ b < v, only low quality producers accept the bribe and Π̂FD(b|f) = (1−e(f))b+
e(f)(f + δΠFD(f)). Whenever b ≥ v, all producers reject the bribe and the certifier
obtains Π̂FD(b|f) = ΠFD(f).
If Π̂FD(b|f) exceeds ΠFD(f), the certifier is actually better off becoming captured with
the associated probability p(b|f). We say that certification at a fee f is capture proof if
and only if
ΠFD(f) ≥ Π̂FD(b|f) (4.2)
for all b. Note that Π̂FD(b|f) is increasing in b, both on [0, f) and [f, v) and it is constant
for b ≥ v. Furthermore Π̂FD(·|f) is continuous at b = f .18 Therefore, certifier profits from
bribery are largest when b approaches v. Evaluating this yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Under a full disclosure rule, an equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 is
capture proof. It exists if and only if
δ ≥ δFD(f) ≡ v
v + piFD(f)
(4.3)
The proposition highlights the crucial role the discount factor plays for the existence of
honest, i.e. capture proof, equilibria: the critical discount factor determines the relative
18To see this compare the left and right limit: limb↗f Π̂FD(b|f) = f + e(f)δΠFD(f) = (1− e(f))f +
e(f)
(
f + δΠFD(f)
)
= limb↘f Π̂FD(b|f).
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Figure 4: Capture proof combinations of (e, δ) resp. (f, δ) under full disclosure.
weights of the short run gain - the bribe b - and the long run loss of capture - foregone
future profits from certification. To see this, note that all bribes b < v are accepted
with some positive probability and therefore, the largest possible short-run gain equals
v. In the long run, a certifier risks her per-period profits piFD(f). As the certification fee
only enters via the per-period profit, δFD(f) depends on f only through piFD(f), which
is concave in f . Therefore δFD(f) must be convex in f and minimized at the profit
maximizing fee fFD. The following corollary summarizes.
Corollary 1. For any discount factor δ ≥ δFD there exists an interval of fees [fl(δ), fh(δ)],
which sustains capture-proof certification under full disclosure, where
δFD ≡ v
v + piFD
. (4.4)
In the right part of Figure 4 the set of feasible (δ, f)-combinations for full disclosure is
depicted.
An immediate consequence from this is that the static monopoly fee fFD can sustain
honest certification for all discount factors δ ≥ δFD. Alternatively one might ask the
question, what level of producer investment can be implemented via capture-proof cer-
tification with a full disclosure rule? The analysis follows the same arguments as above,
only that certifier profits in the inequality of Proposition 2 are expressed in terms of e.
Proposition 3. For any δ ≥ δFD there exists an interval of investment levels [eFDl (δ), eFDh (δ)]
that can be implemented in a capture-proof equilibrium. A particular investment level
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e ∈ [0, e∗] can be implemented in a capture-proof equilibrium with full disclosure if and
only if
δ ≥ δFD(e) ≡ v
v + e · (v − k′(e)) (4.5)
.
The set of feasible (e, δ)-combinations is depicted in the left part of Figure 4.
Note that the first-best investment level e∗ can only be (virtually) implemented for δ = 1.
Whenever δ < 1, fees must be strictly positive in order to induce the certifier to remain
honest. But then, the producer does not obtain the entire return on his investment.
Hence, it must be that e < e∗.
4.2 Capture under partial disclosure
We next argue that alternative noisy disclosure rules can improve certifier credibility in
the sense that they increase the range of discount factors that allow for capture-proof equi-
libria. To gain an intuition for this consider condition (4.3). This condition summarizes
the trade-off between short-run gains and long-run losses. A larger profit piD(f) reduces
the critical discount factor and full disclosure guarantees maximal per-period profits. On
the other hand, δFD(f) is decreasing in v, which represents the the maximal bribe still
accepted by low-type producers and therefore the largest possible short-run gain from
capture. Using noisy disclosure the certifier can affect the maximal short-run gain in var-
ious dimensions. First of all, lowering the value of the best certificate or increasing the
value of the worst certificate (resp. the value of uncertified products) decreases the gap
between particular certification outcomes. This effect can be used to reduce the maximal
bribe which producers are willing to pay. Second, with noisy disclosure the certifier can
sustain an outcome where both producer types demand certification. Upon colluding
with a producer type the certifier foregoes the regular certification fee, which reduces the
effective gain from becoming captured.
Before analyzing noisy disclosure rules, we have to reconsider the detection possibilities
by consumers. An implication of noisy rules is that consumers may hold probabilistic
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beliefs about a product’s quality. In order to simplify matters and because it suffices
to make our point clear, we focus on partial disclosure rules as as introduced in section
3. Other noisy disclosure rules are discussed in section 5 and in the appendix. Under
partial disclosure, there are again two certificates C1 and C2, where certificate C1 is
awarded exclusively to high quality products and C2 is awarded to a high quality seller
with probability 1− α and to every low quality seller. With an appropriately chosen fee
f all producer types demand certification, hence there are no uncertified products on the
equilibrium path. The corresponding off-equilibirum belief is q∅ = 0. The fact that C1 is
awarded exclusively to high quality products makes effective trigger punishment possible.
In particular, it then suffices that the certifier is punished only if probability zero events
(a low quality product was awarded certificate C1) are observed. The fact that capture
detection is not possible if bribes are being paid in exchange for the low value certificate
C2, which is assigned to both high and low types, turns out not to be crucial. This
relies on the fact that in the equilibria under consideration all producer types demand
certification, hence receiving certificate C2 is the worst possible outcome. Certificate C2
can therefore not be part of a profitable bribing offer, as we will argue later.
To specify consumer beliefs, let ht = (Ct, qt) denote the certification outcome in period t
and, as before, Ht = (h1, . . . , ht−1) describes the history of certification before period t.
Consumer’s beliefs are specified as follows
Assumption 2. The consumers’ beliefs q˜t(Ct, Ht) satisfy q˜t(Ct, Ht) = q˜
Ct whenever
{τ < t|Prob(C = Cτ |q = qτ ) = 0 ∨ Cτ /∈ C ∪ {∅}} = ∅. Moreover q˜t(Ct, Ht) = 0 when
either Ct /∈ C or {τ < t|Prob(C = Ct|q = qt) = 0 ∨ Cτ /∈ C ∪ {∅}} 6= ∅.
Note that in contrast to Assumption 1, the consumer trust the certifier unless probability
zero events occured in the past. Because the crucial bribe entails certificate C1, which is
exclusively awarded to high quality producers, this essentially says that consumers stop
trusting the certifier, whenever they find a low quality product carrying certificate C1.
Cheating on the lottery leading to certificate C2 is not detected and also not punished,
but because this certificate corresponds to the worst outcome this will not happen as a
result of a capture offer.
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Bribing offers can now be of two kinds: (C1, b) and (C2, b). Offer (C2, b) is never ben-
eficial. It would only be accepted for b < f , since any producer receives at least the
certificate C2 when applying for (honest) certification and the certifier gets f from any
producer who is honestly tested. Thus, we can focus on bribing offers of the form (C1, b),
which we will simply refer to as b. Recall that certificate C1 can only be awarded to
high quality products. Hence, qC
1
= v. To simplify notation, denote V2 the value of a
C2-certified product, i.e. V2 = q
C2 . Furthermore, recall that α is the probability with
which a high type is awarded C1.
A bribe b is accepted by low types whenever V2 − f < v − b. High quality producers
accept b if αv + (1− α)V2 − f < v − b. Denote e(α) the equilibrium investment.19 Then
bribery acceptance probabilities are
p(b|α, f) =

1, if b < f + (1− α)(v − V2),
1− e(α), if f + (1− α)(v − V2) ≤ b < f + (v − V2),
0, if b ≥ f + (v − V2).
Let ΠPD(α, f) denote the expected profit from applying a partial disclosure rule and
honestly disclosing information in each period. The corresponding expected certifier
profits from bribing offer b are
Π̂(b|α, f) =

b+ e(α)δΠPD(α, f), if b < f + (1− α)(v − V2),
(1− e(α))b+ e(α) (f + δΠPD(α, f)) , if f + (1− α)(v − V2) ≤ b < f + (v − V2),
ΠPD(α, f), if b ≥ f + (v − V2).
Note that whenever high types accept the bribery offer, this is not perceived as cheating
because the certificate then matches the observed quality level. Again, Π̂(b|α, f) is in-
creasing in the respective subintervals. But the function now exhibits a downward-jump
at b = f + (1 − α)(v − V2). The reason is that high types are willing to accept bribes
19The investment decision does not depend on the fee because in equilibrium, all types apply for
certification and therefore pay f anyway. The expected producer profit is e(αV1 + (1 − α)V2) + (1 −
e)V2 − f − k(e) and consequently the optimal investment level depends on α but not on f .
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strictly larger than the certification fee f to avoid the lottery between the good and the
bad certificate. Therefore, at least locally, the certifier is better off bribing all producers
instead of only the low types as it was the case with full disclosure. Furthermore, the
maximal bribe that is accepted by at least some types is now f + v−V2, which is weakly
lower than under full disclosure, where the maximal bribe is v.20 Revisiting condition
(4.2), we say certification at fee f with noise level α is capture-proof, if and only if
ΠPD(α, f) ≥ Π̂(b|α, f). (4.6)
Analyzing this latter condition yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4. With partial disclosure, an equilibrium satisfying Assumption 2 is capture-
proof. It exists if and only if
δ ≥ δPD(α, f) ≡ max
{
δl(α, f), δl,h(α, f)
}
, (4.7)
where δl(α, f) = v−V2v−V2+f and δ
l,h(α, f) = (1−α)(v−V2)(1−α)(v−V2)+(1−e(α))f .
The result gives a lower bound on the discount factor δ to guarantee existence of a
capture-proof equilibrium with partial disclosure. The critical discount factor discount
factor δPD(α, f) depends on the parameters in the way how they affect short-run gain
and long-run loss from capture and on which producer types accept the bribing offer that
yields largest deviation profits. The term δl(α, f) refers to the case where the largest
threat stems from bribes accepted only by low types. The numerator v−V2 is the effective
bribe, defined as the bribery payment minus foregone payments. In the denominator we
find again the effective bribe and the per-period profit f , reflecting the long-run loss
from capture. The term δl,h(α, f) refers to the case where the largest threat stems from
bribes accepted by all types. Here the effective bribe is (1−α)(v−V2). Since the long-run
profit is only at stake if quality is low, long-run profits are lost with probability (1−e(α)).
Although the classical trade-off between short-run gain and long-run loss, that we already
20In order to have all producer types demand certification it has to hold that f ≤ V2. Consequently
f + v − V2 ≤ v.
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identified for full disclosure, prevails, the derivation of the maximal short-run gain is more
involved for partial disclosure.
From Proposition 4 we identify a third notable difference between capture under full
and noisy disclosure. Short-run gains from capture can be reduced due to the different
equilibrium structure: all producers certify in equilibrium which implies that the certifier
always loses fee payments if he is captured. Therefore, a larger fee f not only increases
the long-run losses but at the same time reduces the short-run gains from capture.
It is now straightforward to see that δPD(α, f) is decreasing in the certification fee f .
This implies that for any partial disclosure rule (i.e. any α) the threat of capture is lowest
when f is maximal. To keep all producers applying for certification, f cannot exceed V2.
It is therefore optimal to set f = V2, which leaves low quality producers with an expected
profit of zero. The following corollary summarizes.
Corollary 2. With partial disclosure a capture-proof equilibrium satisfying Assumption
2 exists if and only if
δ ≥ δPD(α) ≡ max
{
δl(α), δl,h(α)
}
, (4.8)
where δl(α) = v−e(α)(v−k
′(e(α)))
v and δ
l,h(α) = 11+e(α) .
Corollary 2 allows us to reduce the problem of finding the critical discount factor for
partial disclosure to the one-dimensional problem of finding the optimal level of α, the
probability that high quality is revealed. In fact, δPD(α) depends on α only through
the equilibrium value for producer investment e(α). The set of investment levels that
can be implemented by partial disclosure is (0, e∗), the same set as for full disclosure.
Defining δPD ≡ minα δPD(α) allows us to formulate the analog of Proposition 3 for
partial disclosure.
Proposition 5. For any δ ≥ δPD there exists an interval of investment levels [ePDl (δ), ePDh (δ)]
that can be implemented in a capture-proof equilibrium. A particular investment level
e ∈ [0, e∗] can be implemented in a capture-proof equilibrium with noisy disclosure if and
only if
δ ≥ δPD(e) = max
{
δPD,l(e), δPD,l,h(e)
}
(4.9)
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where δPD,l(e) = v−e(v−k
′(e))
v and δ
PD,l,h(e) = 11+e .
Proposition 5 makes implementation of capture-proof equilibrium under full and partial
disclosure directly comparable. Before investigating this in the next section we want
to highlight some properties of the function δPD(e). Writing e(v − k′(e)) = piPD(e) =
f the term δPD,l(e) can be expressed as (v − f)/(v − f + piPD(e)). This resembles
the trade-off between short-run gain and long-run loss, already identified above. Only
the maximal short-run gain with partial disclosure is the maximal bribe minus foregone
regular payments. The same trade-off leads to δPD,l,h(e), which is however independent
of the producer’s cost function k(e). The maximal bribe that is accepted from both
producer types in particular must be accepted from high quality producers. For them, the
difference between the sure certificate C1 and the lottery faced when certifying honestly
matters. This difference is closely related to a producers’ investment incentives, in fact
one can show that the maximal bribe equals v − k′(e). Now both short-run gain and
long-run loss depend in a similar way on the investment incentives21 and consequently
the fraction δPD,l,h(e) does not depend on the producers cost function anymore.
Which of the two terms, δPD,l(e) and δPD,l,h(e), is now larger? δPD,l,h(e) is decreasing in
e, starting at 1 for e = 0 towards 1/2 for e = 1. On the other hand δPD,l(e) is convex in
e with a unique minimum at e = eFD. Furthermore δPD,l(0) = δPD,l(1) = 1. Therefore,
δPD is either δPD,l(eFD), that is the minimum of δPD,l, or it is the intersection of both
fractions lying to the right of e = eFD. Figure 5 illustrates the two cases, the latter in
its left part.
4.3 Sub-optimality of full disclosure
In the previous sections, we identified the conditions under which capture-proof equilibria
exist for full disclosure and a special class of noisy disclosure rules. These conditions are
expressed in terms of the critical discount factors δFD and δPD. It is the aim of this study
21As discussed, the short-run gain equals v − k′(e). The long-run loss is the per-period profit, which
was already shown to be e(v − k′(e)).
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Figure 5: Capture-proof (e, δ)-combinations for low (left) and high (right) marginal costs
k′ at e = eFD.
to show that opaque disclosure rules can be used by the certifier to improve his credibility.
Comparing the critical discount factors δFD and δPD is short-hand for comparing the
entire sets of (e, δ)-combinations, for which a capture-proof equilibrium exists with the
respective disclosure rule. We are going to prove in this section that the two sets are
different and, more importantly, that the respective set for full disclosure is contained in
the respective set for partial disclosure. Consequently there exists an intermediate range
of discount factors for which there does not exist a capture-proof equilibrium with full
disclosure, but it is still possible to sustain capture-proof equilibria with partial disclo-
sure.
As we have discussed several times throughout this paper, the key trade-off for imple-
menting a capture-proof equilibrium is that of short-run gain versus long-run loss. Either
disclosure rule leads to a per-period profit of pi(e) = e(v − k′(e)) when implementing
effort level e, the potential long-run loss is therefore the same. However, with partial
disclosure the short-run gain from becoming captured by only low quality producers is
v − f , compared to v for full disclosure. The resulting trade-off is resolved in favor of
partial disclosure. So far this assumes that the largest threat of capture indeed stems
from low quality producers. Although this is in general true for full disclosure, it ceases
to hold for partial disclosure. When the maximal threat stems from a bribe accepted by
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all producer types, the long-run loss is reduced. Only when the producer is of low quality
this is perceived as cheating by consumers and punished accordingly. So per-period prof-
its are only lost with probability 1− e. On the other hand such a bribe must be smaller
in order to be acceptable for high quality producers, which reduces the short-run gain.
The following proposition proves that the latter effect outweighs the former.
Proposition 6. It holds that δPD < δFD. For any δ ∈ [δPD, δFD], a capture-proof
equilibrium can only be sustained applying a noisy disclosure rule. Furthermore, for any
δ ≥ δFD, we have that [eFDl (δ), eFDh (δ)] ( [ePDl (δ), ePDh (δ)].
Proposition 6 shows our main result that opacity can be used as a tool to improve
certifier credibility. For any level of producer investment e, the range of discount factors
that allow for capture-proof implementation of e is strictly larger for partial disclosure
compared to full disclosure. Similarly, for any discount factor δ, the set of investment
levels that are implementable in a capture-proof equilibrium with partial disclosure is
strictly larger then the corresponding set for full disclosure. The superiority of partial
disclosure therefore goes along two dimensions. Figure 6 displays these differences. The
dark-grey area corresponds to (e, δ)-combinations that can be implemented as a capture-
proof equilibrium under full disclosure. The light-grey area shows the additional (e, δ)-
pairs that allow for implementation in capture-proof equilibrium under partial disclosure.
In Section 3, we show that a certifier would always want to implement eFD as this
maximizes her per-period profits. With full disclosure, this is only possible when δ ≥ δFD.
Partial disclosure allows for capture-proof equilibria also for lower discount factors. It is
remarkable that, at least for a range of discount factors, this can be achieved without
waiving any profits. To see this, denote δ˜(piFD) the smallest discount factor, such that
a capture-proof equilibrium is sustained and achieves per-period profits of piFD. The
following corollary is an immediate consequence of Proposition 6.
Corollary 3. It holds that
δ˜(piFD) = max
{
v − piFD
v
,
1
1 + eFD
}
< δFD.
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Figure 6: Dark-grey: capture-proof certification with full disclosure. Light-grey: (addi-
tional) capture-proof certification with noisy disclosure.
4.4 Welfare properties of partial disclosure
In this subsection, we study welfare properties of capture-proof equilibria with partial
disclosure. When δ˜(piFD) = δPD we also have δPD = (v − piFD)/v. In this case, the
largest threat of capture stems from low quality producers, i.e. the largest deviation profit
for the certifier is achieved for b = v. Then the certifier can still achieve the maximal
per-period profits piFD in a capture-proof equilibrium for any δ ≥ δPD, which implies
implementing e = eFD.
This is however not true when δ˜(piFD) > δPD. As can be seen from Figure 6, for
discount factors below δ˜(piFD) the profit maximizing level of investment eFD is no longer
capture-proof implementable. Instead only larger values of producer investment can
be implemented when δ ∈ [δPD, δ˜(piFD)). To provide an intuition for this, note the
following: Bribing offers b that are accepted by all producer types pose the largest threat.
Now, implementing a larger e leads to a reduction in V2, as otherwise profits would
increase beyond piFD. To incentivize producers to make larger investments, the certifier
therefore has to increase α. As now shown, for high quality producers the difference in
expected profits between the lottery of the certification process and the sure certificate v
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is reduced.22 This in turn lowers the maximum bribe they are willing to pay for capture
and therefore reduces the short-run gain for the certifier from any such offer. From a
welfare perspective this increase in investment is beneficial. Social welfare is given by
e · v − k(e) in each period. The first-best investment level e∗ was shown to be strictly
larger than eFD and welfare is strictly increasing on [0, e∗]. Implementing certification
with partial disclosure for discount factors δ ∈ [δPD, δ˜(piFD)] therefore increases social
welfare compared to doing so for larger levels of the discount factor. Put differently, a
severe threat of capture increases welfare. We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Assume δ˜(piFD) > δPD. For intermediate levels of the discount factor,
i.e. δ ∈ [δPD, δ˜(piFD)), only investment levels that are strictly larger than eFD can be
capture-proof implemented with partial disclosure. This leads to increased social welfare.
5 Discussion
We analyze the effects of reputational concerns on optimal disclosure rules from the point
of view of a monopolistic certifier. Our main finding is that if capture is an issue, a certifier
benefits from resorting to coarser certification in order to reduce the threat of capture and
this is indepent of a potential profit concern that pushes the certifier in the same direction.
In particular, for medium discount factors, sustaining honest certification is impossible if
information is fully disclosed whereas it is still possible if information disclosure is noisy.
Implications of our analysis are manifold. First of all we provide a novel explanation for
the occurrence of imperfect testing. In many papers on e.g. rating agencies (examples
include Mathis et al. (2009) and Bolton et al. (2012)) imperfect testing is exogenously
given, whereas here it arises in equilibrium. An empirical implication is that for low
discount factors we expect disclosure to be coarser. This is consistent with the casual
observation that certification in markets with low volume, such as wine, technical inspec-
tions or eco-labels often involves only a few different certificates. On the other hand,
the high volume rating market exhibits a rather wide variety of different but still coarse
22Honest certification yields an expected payoff αv+(1−α)V2. This value is reduced when α increases
and V2 decreases at the same time.
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certificates per rating agency.
Our findings also have important policy implications. Politics tend to push certifiers to
precisely reveal information.23 Our results suggest that doing so may lead to unforeseen
consequences for the functioning of those markets, as it might become more difficult to
build up a reputation and resist capture if certificates are required to be too precise.
Similarly, regarding the current financial crisis, forcing rating agencies to issue more
precise information might even exacerbate capture problems.
We demonstrate our results in a highly stylized model, but the intuition behind our results
is general. In particular, they carry over to more than only two quality specifications.
Such a specification is on the one hand actually simpler, as it can be shown that already
coarse deterministic disclosure rules outperform full disclosure. On the other hand the
analysis is complicated by the fact that full disclosure is not necessarily optimal anymore,
when capture is ignored. The first point already becomes clear from a setting with
three quality levels. Full disclosure can then entail both the highest and the medium
quality producer demand certification. A coarse rule would specify one certificate awarded
to all but low quality. Obviously, for both rules the same types of producer demand
certification. In the latter case however the maximal bribe is strictly lower. For similar
investment levels and fees, the critical discount factor is therefore strictly lower for the
coarse rule. The precise analysis is more complicated, since the coarse rule generates
different investment incentives for producers. In Appendix B we offer an illustration for
a special case of probability distributions.
We point out that our restriction to a particular class of noisy disclosure rules is without
loss of generality. First, offering various coarse certificates generates incentives for the
certifier to always offer the best among the noisy certificates in a bribing offer. This
will be accepted (at least by low quality producers) in order to avoid a lottery that
includes the worst certificates. As deviations of this kind remain undetected they will
occur with certainty, that destroys the equilibrium. Second, disclosure rules that do
not allow for unambiguous detection of deviations call for a different type of trigger
23Such as in the Dodd-Frank Act, see Footnote 3
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beliefs. Consumers lose trust in the certifier whenever they first detect low quality sold
with the best certificate. This leads to punishments even if collusion did not take place.
The harsher punishments makes it impossible to sustain capture proof equilibria for low
discount factors. Proposition 8 in the appendix makes this statement precise.
Also the assumptions on the certifier’s policy space is not restrictive. In our two period
model, a full disclosure rule is equivalent to certificate-dependent payments: for a good
certificate pay the certification fee f and for the bad certificate pay zero. By the revelation
principle an optimal policy incolves a certification contract for each of the two quality
types. It is then straightforward to verify that the optimal policy is equivalent to a full
disclosure rule with a flat fee.
Finally we use a specific extensive form to model capture. More sophisticated forms
to study imply non-uniform bribing offers, e.g. menus, to elicit the producers’ private
information. Also, later bribing, after the certifier learned q or giving producers the
possibility to signal their private information are possible extensions. The exact extensive
form may well affect parts of the analysis, but the main finding of the advantage of opacity
does not depend on the specific extensive form.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Follows immediately from the arguments given in the text.
Proof of Lemma 2. Following the arguments given in the text the certifier maximizes
(3.2). Recall that we assume k′′′(·) ≥ 0, which ensures that this profit function is concave
in e, thus the first-order condition is sufficient for an optimum. This first-order condition
is 0 = v − k′(e) − ek′′(e). Define Ψ(e) = v − k′(e) − ek′′(e). We have Ψ(0) = v > 0
and Ψ(1) = v − k′(1)− k′′(1) ≤ 0 by our assumptions on k(·). Furthermore Ψ is strictly
decreasing due to strict concavity of k(·). Hence there exists a unique eFD such that
Ψ(eFD) = 0, which consequently is the unique maximizer of the certifier profit. The
formulas for eFD and fFD follow easily from the formulas above.
Proof of Proposition 1. First of all a disclosure rule can potentially lead to four dif-
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ferent subgames: (1) no producer demands certification, (2) only low quality producers
demand certification, (3) only high quality producers demand certification, and (4) all
producers demand certification. Note that we do not explicitly consider mixed strategies
by producers. The reason is that any outcome where some producers randomize their
certification decision can be replicated by a disclosure rule that adds the respective prob-
abilities for not certifying to the probabilities of remaining uncertified though paying for
certification. To see this, assume type i chooses to certify with probability γ ∈ (0, 1).
Now multiply every αi by γ and increase the probability of remaining uncertified ap-
propriately. After changing the fee from f to γf , it is easy to see that this adjusted
disclosure with the reduced fee leads to the same investment incentives and also to the
same equilibrium prices for (un-)certified products and the certifiers profit is unchanged.
Case (1) trivially leads to zero profits and the claim is proven.
Case (2) leads to consumers paying zero in equilibrium for certified products.24 To make
low quality producers “pay” for certification we consequently must have f = 0 which
leads to zero profits and proves our claim also in this case.
Case (3) can be analyzed as follows: If only high types certify, rational behavior by con-
sumers dictates that a certified product is sold at a price v. Uncertified products however
can be of either high or low quality and have some price q∅ ∈ [0, v).
A producer’s investment decision is given by the solution of
max
e
e
(∑
k
α1kv + (1−
∑
k
α1k)q
∅ − f
)
+ (1− e)q∅ − k(e),
which yields the following first-order condition for producer investment:
(∑
k
α1k(v − q∅)− f
)
= k′(e).
Rewriting this constraint in terms of induced investment yields f = v − k′(e) − (1 −
24A disclosure leading to this particular subgame is given by C = {C}, αl = 1 and αh = 0.
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∑
k α
1
k)(v − q∅)− q∅. Now we have for the certifier profit
piD(f) = e(f,D) · f = e · (v − k′(e)− (1−∑
k
α1k)(v − q∅)− q∅
) ≤ e · (v − k′(e)) ≤ piFD.
This proves the claim for case (3).
Finally consider case (4): When both producer types demand certification, the resulting
certifier profit in the subgame is piD(f) = f . The price at which a product holding
certificate Ci can be sold is
qC
i
= v · eα
h
i
eαhi + (1− e)αli
.
Uncertified products are sold at price q∅ = v · e
(
1−∑
i
αhi
)
e
(
1−∑
i
αhi
)
+(1−e)
(
1−∑
i
αli
) . A producer’s
investment decision follows from maximizing his expected payoff from certification, given
by
e ·
(∑
i
αhi q
Ci +
(
1−
∑
i
αhi
)
q∅
)
+ (1− e) ·
(∑
i
αliq
Ci +
(
1−
∑
i
αli
)
q∅
)
−f −k(e).
The resulting investment constraint is
k′(e) =
∑
i
(αhi − αli)(qC
i − q∅). (A.1)
On the other hand, from the formula given for qC
i
we have eαhi q
Ci +(1−e)αliqC
i
= evαhi .
Similarly e(1 − ∑i αhi )q∅ + (1 − e)(1 − ∑i αli)q∅ = ev(1 − ∑i αhi ). Summing those
expressions yields
∑
i
(
eαhi q
Ci + (1− e)αliqC
i
)
+ e(1−
∑
i
αhi )q
∅ + (1− e)(1−
∑
i
αli)q
∅ = ev. (A.2)
Rewriting the left hand side of equation (A.2) yields
e
∑
i
(αhi − αli)(qC
i − q∅) +
∑
i
αliq
Ci +
(
1−
∑
i
αli
)
q∅ = ev. (A.3)
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Finally, to make all producer types demand certification we must have in particular
f ≤
∑
i
αliq
Ci +
(
1−
∑
i
αli
)
q∅ (A.4)
i.e. low quality producers ecpected payoff from certification must be non-negative.25
From this we can derive an upper bound on certifier profits:
piD(f) = f
(A.4)
≤
∑
i
αliq
Ci +
(
1−
∑
i
αli
)
q∅
(A.3)
= ev − e
∑
i
(αhi − αli)(qC
i − q∅)
(A.1)
= ev − ek′(e) = e(v − k′(e)).
But e (v − k′(e)) is the profit from implementing effort level e optimally with a full dis-
closure rule, therefore we have proven piD(f) ≤ piFD.
Proof of Proposition 2. In any equilibrium in which Assumption 1 holds capture may
not take place, since otherwise the beliefs of consumers are not consistent with the be-
havior of the certifier. Hence, condition (4.2) must be satisfied for all b. As mentioned in
the text, certifier profits from deviating Π̂FD(b|f) are largest for b approaching v. Taking
this limit yields
lim
b↗v
Π̂FD(b|f) = (1− e(f))v + e(f) · (f + δΠFD(f))
= (1− e(f))v + piFD(f) + δ
1− δ e(f)pi
FD(f)
= (1− e(f))v − δ
1− δ (1− e(f))pi
FD(f) + ΠFD(f).
Condition (4.2) is thus equivalent to
(1− e(f))v ≤ δ
1− δ (1− e(f))pi
FD(f).
25More conditions are required in subgame where all producer types demand certification, but the
one presented her is the only required for our proof.
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Rearranging this expression yields that condition (4.2) is satisfied if and only if
δ ≥ δFD(f) ≡ v
v + piFD(f)
.
Proof of Proposition 3. We first argue how condition (4.3) can be translated towards
(4.5). Recall piFD(f) = e(f) · f and optimal investment by producers requires k′(e) =
v − f . Replacing f by v − k′(e) yields (4.5). All other statements are straightforward
reformulations of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. In any equilibrium in which Assumption 2 holds capture may
not take place, since otherwise the beliefs of consumers are not consistent with the be-
havior of the certifier. Hence, condition (4.6) must be satisfied for all b. We compute
the respective critical discount factors. Taking the limit of Π̂D(b|f) as b approaches
f + (1− α)(v − V2) we get
lim
b↗f+(1−α)(v−V2)
Π̂D(b|f) = f + (1− α)(v − V2) + e(α)δΠPD(f)
= f + (1− α)(v − V2) + e(α) δ
1− δf
= (1− α)(v − V2)− δ
1− δ (1− e(α))f + Π
PD(f).
Consequently this limit lies below ΠPD(f) if and only if
(1− α)(v − V2) ≤ δ
1− δ (1− e(α))f,
respectively whenever
δ ≥ δl,h(α, f) = (1− α)(v − V2)
(1− α)(v − V2) + (1− e(α))f .
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Similarly the limit of Π̂D(b|f) as b approaches f + (v − V2) can be rewritten as follows
lim
b↗f+(v−V2)
Π̂D(b|f) = (1− e(α)) · (f + (v − V2)) + e(α)
(
f + δΠPD(f)
)
= (1− e(α))(v − V2)− δ
1− δ (1− e(α))f + Π
PD(f).
Therefore limb↗f+(v−V2) Π̂
D(b|f) ≤ ΠPD(f) if and only if
δ ≥ δl(α, f) = v − V2
f + v − V2 .
Because capture-proofness requires Π̂D(b|f) ≤ ΠPD(f) for all b, (4.7) follows.
Proof of Corollary 2. As discussed in the text, the certifier may set f = V2 to minimize
the threat of capture. We consider δl(α, f) first. Making use of f = V2 allows us to
simplify it to (v − V2)/v. From the proof of Proposition 1 we get V2 = e(v − k′(e)) and
therefore
δl(α) =
v − V2
v
=
v − e(α)(v − k′(e(α)))
v
.
Now consider δl,h(α, f). With f = V2 we may rewrite
δl,h(α, f) =
(1− α)(v − V2)
(1− α)(v − V2) + (1− e(α))V2
By Bayesian updating we have V2 = v ·
(
(1− α)e(α))/(1− αe(α)) in equilibrium, which
implies v − V2 = v ·
(
1− e(α))((1− αe(α)). Replacing V2 and v − V2 accordingly yields
(1− α)(v − V2)
(1− α)(v − V2) + (1− e(α))V2 =
1
1 + e(α)
.
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall, that with full disclosure the critical discount factor is
δFD(e) = vv+piFD(e) =
v
v+e(v−k′(e)) and this term is minimized for the profit maximizing
effort e, yielding mine δ
FD(e) = vv+piFD . For all e ∈ (0, e∗) we have v−e(v−k
′(e))
v < δ
FD(e).
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To see this:
v − e(v − k′(e))
v
< δFD(e) =
v
v + e(v − k′(e)) ⇔
(
e(v − k′(e)))2 > 0.
Also
1
1 + e
< δFD(e) =
v
v + e(v − k′(e)) ⇔ ek
′(e) > 0
Therefore also max{ 11+e , v−e(v−k
′(e))
v } < δFD(e) for all e ∈ (0, e∗) and hence we can define
δPD := min
e
max
{
1
1 + e
,
v − e(v − k′(e))
v
}
and it follows that δFD > δPD. Since both δPD,l(e) < δFD(e) and δPD,l,h(e) < δFD(e)
the last statement follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 7. When δPD < δ˜(piFD) we must have δ˜(piFD) = δPD(eFD) =
1
1+eFD . Since 1/1 + e decreases in e we have δ
PD(e) > δ˜(piFD) for any e < eFD. Con-
sequently we must have δPD(e) < δ˜(piFD) on some interval [eFD, eˆ]. This proves our
result.
B Extensions
B.1 Examples for more than two levels of quality
Example 1.
Let quality levels be {0, 0.5, 1} and P (q = 0.5|e) = P (q = 1|e) = e/2. Consequently
P (q = 0|e) = 1 − e. The cost of effort is k(e) = e2/2. If we restrict the analysis to
deterministic disclosure rules, it is straightforward to show that full disclosure with a fee
f = 3/8 maximizes certifier profits. With this fee both quality levels 0.5 and 1 get certified
in equilibrium. Using the same line of argument as in the main text, this disclosure rule
can be sustained as a capture-proof equilibrium whenever δ ≥ 1619 .
A cut-off disclosure rule that certifies any product whose quality exceeds 0, but does not
distinguish any further, achieves the same static profit as the mentioned full disclosure
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rule. However, the largest possible bribe is then not equal to 1 since no certificate which
yields a price of one is available. Instead, the best certificate yields 3/4, the value of
a certified product. Consequently, a capture-proof equilibrium with this disclosure rule
exists whenever δ ≥ 1620 . While profits remain the same, the largest acceptable bribe is
lowered.
B.2 Alternative disclosure rules for the two-quality case
Proposition 8. For any δ < δFD and any disclosure rule which is such that the highest
certificate’s value is different from v, no capture-proof equilibrium exists.
Proof. We restrict the proof to the following simple disclosure rule26: there are two
certificates, C1 and C2, where high quality always receives C1 and low quality receives
C1 with probability α ∈ (0, 1). Denote V the value of C1, certificate C2 is always worth
zero (in equilibrium). The first-order condition for producer investment reads as
k′(e) = (1− α)V
and from Baye’s rule we have
V = v
e
e+ α(1− e) .
Thus, to implement a particular e, the certifier has to set27
α =
e(v − k′(e))
e(v − k′(e)) + k′(e)
The fee must be such that low quality producers are willing to get their product certified,
i.e. f ≤ αV .
When a purchased product with certificate C1 turns out to be of low quality, consumers
cannot be sure whether this was due to bad luck or to a captures certifier. Appropriate
26For any other rule, the argument is the same for selling the best certificate in a capture offer to the
low quality producer. However, there are even more feasible bribing offers, which make it even harder
to resist the threat of capture.
27Note that lime→0 α equals 1 whenever k′′(0) = 0 and otherwise equals vv+k′′(0)∈(0,1) , that is in the
latter case not all α are implementable.
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trigger beliefs have to be such that the certifier is punished whenever low quality is sold
with certificate C1. This can well happen without any deviation by the certifier. The
probability of entering punishment, absent any deviation, is p = (1 − e)α and expected
profits from honest play are given by
Πh(α, f) = f + (1− p)δf + (1− p)2δ2f + . . . = f
1− (1− p)δ .
The maximal bribe is given by b ≈ (1−α)V +f , where only low quality producers accept
it. The profit from making such an offer is
Π(b|f, α) = (1− e)b+ e(f + δΠh(α, f))
We have Π(b|f, α) ≤ Πh(α, f) for b→ (1− α)V + f whenever
δ ≥ (1− e)b− (1− e)f
(1− e)(1− p)b− epf =
b− f(
1− (1− e)α)b− eαf
This is both increasing in b and in f , such that the largest threat is exercised for f = αV
and b = V , which results in the condition
δ ≥ 1
1 + eα
.
We have 11+eα ≥ vv+e(v−k′(e)) if and only if
v − k′(e) ≥ vα ⇔ 1 ≥ e.
Hence, for all e to be implemented, this is only possible with a noisy rule without sure
high quality certificate, when this is also possible using a full disclosure rule.
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